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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
_ _ _ _ _ _ — _ — _ _ / ' ' ' • — 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
BLAINE D. CASPER, 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner 
Case No* 20556 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a per curiam decision 
filed by this Court on February 27, 1986, Originally, this case 
was an appeal from a guilty plea and conviction of Aggravated 
Burglary,, a fel ony of the FI rst Degree, and Aggravated Assualt, 
a felony of the Third Degree, by Blaine D. Casper. Mr. Casper 
was sentenced in the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, before the Honorable Jay E. Banks,. Judge, to five years 
to life on Aggravated Burglary and zero to five years for 
Aggravated Assat, -n sentences running concurrently. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant 
(Appellant's Brief at 1-3). 
ARGUMENT -
In its per curiam opinion, State v. Casper, Opinion No. 
20556 (Utah 1986), this Court has misapprehended the main conten-
tion advanced by Appellant's Brief. 
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In this case the Court has filed its per curiam 
opinion before the petitioner had an opportunity to submit a 
reply brief. Under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Rule 26, Filing and Service of Briefs (1985), "a reply brief. . . 
may be served and filed by appellant within thirty (30) days after 
the filing and service of respondent's brief. . .". The Respondent's 
Brief here was filed on February 11, 1986, (see respondent's Brief 
at 8), meaning that by statute the Petitioner had until March 15, 
1986, to file a reply. Yet this Court filed its per curiam opinion 
on February 26, 1986, over two full weeks before the statutory 
period to reply had expired. Such a situation clearly violates 
Mr. Casper's Due Process rights. It is not unreasonable to expect 
this Court to follow the rules of appellate procedure which it 
writes. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. (1979) . 
Had Mr. Casper been given time to reply he would have 
availed himself of such an opportunity by contesting the State's < 
claim that there was no legal authority cited in support of the 
Petitioner's claim of bias and prejudice because those cases given 
applied to bias and prejudice at trial, not at the preliminary < 
hearing stage. (See Respondent's Brief at 7-8). Such a contention 
is wholly unsupported by the State and is repugnant in its ultimate 
conclusion: That while a neutral magistrate is essential at the 1 
trial phase, such a guarantee is somehow unnecessary at the 
preliminary hearing. 
The State's position is especially tenuous given this 4 
Court's opinion here that, "The preliminary hearing secures to 
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the accused, before he is brought to trial under an information, 
the right to be advised of the nature of the accusation against 
him and to be confronted with and given an opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses." State v. Casper, Opinion No. 20556 (Utah, 
February 26, 1986). In determining if there is probable cause 
to bind the defendant over for trial, the accused has as much 
a right to expect the magistrate to be neutral and unbiased as 
he has to expect a fair trial. See Anderson v. Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985) (extending right to 
unbiased and impartial judge in admistrative hearings). 
The Court in its per curiam opinion here questions the 
failure of the Petitoner to supply a copy of the preliminary hear-
ing transcript. Without such transcripts, the Court presumed 
"regularity of the proceedings below." State v. Casper, supra. 
Initially, the Petitioner notes that the Supreme Court 
was supplied with a full transcript from all proceedings at the 
District Court level. These transcripts provide the Court with 
all factual information necessary to render a decision, including 
the vital fact that the victim was a well-known employee in the 
circuit where the preliminary hearing took place (see Appellantfs 
Brief at 1-3). The value of the District Court transcripts becomes 
especially important since that is where the claim of bias and 
prejudice is submitted and argued (R.41) (see Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum A). 
In addition, the claim presented on appeal, that the 
preliminary hearing should have been held before a magistrate 
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other than one from the circuit where the victim worked as a 
clerk, can be sustained by the mere appearance of bias or 
prejudice. There need not be a specific allegation set forth, 
making a preliminary hearing transcript unnecessary. 
This Court has had opportunity recently to define when 
disqualification of a judge should occur. In Anderson V. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, supra, this Court stated that, "[0]ne of the 
fundamental principles of due process is that all parties to a 
case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge." In addition, 
this Court added, "[F]airness requires not only an absence of 
actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of un-
fairness. " Id. at 1221 (emphasis added). 
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Madry, 8 Wash. 
2061, 504 P.2d 1150, 1161 (1972), ruled that a judge must not only 
be impartial, but must also have the appearance of impartiality. 
The reason is that "[T]he appearance of bias or prejudice can be 
as damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice 
as would be the actual presence of bias or prejudice." Id. at 1161. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals has followed the well-reasoned 
rule that a judge should be disqualified for even the appearance 
of a lack of impartiality. In Wood Bro. Homes, Inc. v. City of 
Fort Collins, 670 P.2d 9 (Colo. App. 1983), the trial judge, 
prior to his appointment to the bench, had sat on the Planning 
and Zoning Commission which considered and reviewed the plot of 
land that formed the basis for the dispute. The motion to dis-
qualify was denied by the judge on the basis that he had no 
recollection of plaintiff's matter before the Commission. 
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The Court of Appeals stated, "While we find no evidence 
of partiality, we conclude that because of the trial judge's prior 
association with the Commission, one might reasonably question 
his impartiality so as to render it improper for him to have presided 
over the trial in this case." Id. at 10. The court ruled that 
the judge's position on the Planning Commission disqualified him 
from the casef even if the judge had said that he had no recol-
lection of the prior matter. The court continued by saying, "Even 
if the judge's impartiality could not be reasonably questioned, 
we still have a situation which created the appearance of impro-
priety , which precludes the judge from sitting on this case." 
Id. at 10. 
The law, as it has been set forth by this Court, mandates 
that the Petitioner be allowed to submit a reply to the Respondent's 
Brief. In addition, even absent a showing of actual prejudice, 
the Petitioner's showing of possible judicial partiality necessitates 
a remand for a new preliminary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this Court misapprehended the Appellant's primary 
contention in its decision in this case and because the Petitioner 
was denied an opportunity to submit a reply brief, Mr. Casper 
respectfully petitions this Court to withdraw its opinion and 
allow a new thirty (30) day period to submit a reply brief or in 
the alternative, reconsider its decision and reverse the conviction 
and remand the case for further proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this 10 day of March, 1986, 
uk 
S C. BRADSHAW 
torney for Appellant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby certify that four copies 
of the foregoing were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
day of March, 1386. 
S C. BRADSHAW 
torney for Appellant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATION 
I, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, do hereby certify the following: 
1. I am the attorney for appellant/petitioner in this 
case; and 
2. This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this 
Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this fS day of March, 1986. 
z^ . 
'J^MES Cr BRADSHAW 
:torney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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